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REPLY

TO DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM
PLAINTEF'S
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, Pueblo of Sandia, has moved for summ& judgment declaring that the
eastern boundary of its reservation extends to the "main ridge," rather than the foothills,of
.-

.

.

. Sandia Peak

-- the most prominent land feature in the area. The Pueblo's claim stems from

a 1748 land grant from the King of Spain -- one of the few such written grants still extant -which expressly provides that the Pueblo's land extends to that "main ridge." In 1858
Congress confirmed that grant and ordered a conforming survey.
In 1859, however, a government surveyor erroneously meandered the eastern
bdundary of the grant as the foothills of Sandia Peak. That error, buried in surveying
jargon, went undetected for years, while the Pueblo continued to use the a m as its own -principally for its religious ceremonies.
The survey error became apparent after the federal government, in the form of the
Department of Agriculture, the owner of the adjacent eastern half of Sandia Peak, began to

interfere with the Pueblo's use of the claim area. The Pueblo then asked that the

-. Department of the Iliterior, which holds lands for the benefit of the Pueblo and has

jurisdiction over such claims, correct the boyndary. Over a period of five years, the
relevant officials at the Interior Department, including its highest ranking legal authority on
Indian matters, concluded that the Pueblo's claim to the area in question was valid and that
the erroneous survey should be corrected. But in December 1988, Solicitor Ralph Tarr
,

issued a new opinion which reversed the findings of every Interior official who had
previously considered the matter and which rejected the Pueblo's claim. That erroneous

,'

opinion was then adopted, without further comment, by then Secretary Hodel.
In its opening motion for summary judgment, the Pueblo described the well-settled

--

law that the Interior Department has a fiduciary obligation to its Indian wards such as the
Pueblo and that that duty is especially great in this case, where the error was that of a
government surveyor and the beneficiary of that error, if not corrected, will be the federal
government itself.' ' Given that fiduciary duty, the Interior Department was nquired to
order a corrected survey, so long as the Pueblo's claim to the disputed area was

.-

--

.

. "reasonable."

As found by the high-ranking Interior officials who concluded that the

Pueblo had presented an entirely

claim, the Pueblo's position was far more than

"reasonable." Accordingly, the Department's refusal to correct the survey constituted a
breach of the fiduciary duty owed by the Department to its Indian wards.
The Pueblo's claims and legal arguments stand unrebutted - even after the
government's response. The government effectively concedes that the Interior Department
owed a fiduciary duty to the Pueblo and that this duty required the Secntary to c o m t the
survey so long as the tribe's position was reasonable. The government does not even
The Pueblo has waived any right to recover the small portion of the claim area that has
been transferred to private parties. It seeks only to transfer title to the lands wronghlly

held by the Agriculture Department to the Interior Department, where they may rightfully
be held in trust and administered for the benefit of the Pueblo.

attempt to dispute those propositions. Instead, the government seeks to avoid summary
judgment by repeating the same arguments i t previously raised in its motion to dismiss.
Those arguments are no more valid today than they were last year when they were rejected
by this Court. O~inionand Order of December 10. 1996 (hereinafter "Dec. 10, 1996
Opinion").
In short, the undisputed facts demonstrate that the Pueblo presented the Interior
Department with a reasonable -- indeed valid -- claim to the area in question and thus the

-t

,'

Secretary had a fiduciary duty to order the corrected survey. Summary judgment in favor
of the Pueblo is thus appropriate. 2
-

I.

The Government Does Not Even Attempt to Respond
to the Pueblo's Arguments for Summnrv Judement
In its motion and memorandum in support, the Pueblo established that it was entitled to

summary judgment because (1) the Interior Department has a fiduciary duty to correct erroneous
government surveys that are adverse to the interests of its Indian wards; (2) the Pueblo's claim

-

--

.

. to the disputed area was not only reasonable, but in fact meritorious, as the Department's

highest ranking officials on Indian matters recognized on a number of occasions; and (3) the
T a n opinion, refusing to correct the erroneous survey, was both legally and factually flawed.
The government's decision to ignore the Pueblo's demonstration of these three propositions in
no way distracts from their decisive effect.

This combined memorandum replies to the government's opposition to the Pueblo's
motion for summary judgment and responds to the government's cross-motion for summary
judgment as well. As shown below, the government's cross-motion should be denied for
essentially the same reasons that the Pueblo's motion should be granted.

A.

The Government Does Not Dispute that the Interior
De~artmentOwes a Fiduciarv
Dutv to the Pl~eblo

The government does not -- and cannot -- dispute that the Secretary of the Interior
owes a fiduciary duty to the Pueblo. As discussed in detail in the Pueblo's memorandum in
support of its motion for summary judgment (Memorandum (June 26, 1996) at 10-16), the

.
.t

Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises when the
Government assumes such elaborate control over . . . property belonging to Indians."

'.

United States v. Mitchell. 463 U.S.206, 225 (1983). $cealso Seminole Nation v. United

States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942); Priero v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 1187, 1193
... (D.D.C. 1987); P e o ~ l eof Tooiak v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 423, 428 (D.D.C. 1979).
That fiduciary relationship
"'exists with respect to such

. . . properties . . . even though nothine is

,&expressly in the authorizing or underlying statute (or other

fundamental~document)about a trust fund, or a trust or fiduciary
connection."' Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 225 (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
.-

.

.

. The government does not dispute that fiduciary duty.

The government likewise does not dispule that, by surveying the Pueblo's grant, the
Interior Department exercised just "such elaborate control" over the Pueblo's property in
this case. Indeed, the act of establishing the tribe's boundaries through the congressional
confirmation of the original Spanish grant, and then the subsequent erroneous survey by a
government surveyor, constitute the ultimate control over Indian lands. As the govemment
implicitly concedes, the Interior Department was thus obligated to "act as a fiduciary
towards those lands." White Mountain A~acheTribe of Arizona, v. United States, 11 C1.
Ct. 614, 650 (1987), aff'd, 5 F.3d 1506 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1538

(1994).

Moreover, sibsequent statutory and judicial considerations of the trust relationship

- pueblos have confirmed that the federal
between the United States and the New Mexico
government's powers with respect to pueblo lands creates a corresponding fiduciary duty to
act as a trustee towad its Indian wards. In 1910, for example, the restraints against
alienation and protection of Indian lands in the Trade and Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C.
,

8 177,~
were made directly applicable to pueblo lands through the New Mexico Enabling
(Statehood) Act. That Act provides that "the terms 'Indian' and 'Indian country' shall

-3

',

include the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico and the lands now owned or occupied by them."
Act of June 20, 1910,ch. 310,5 2,36 Stat. 557,558. A few years later, the Supreme
.-

Court in United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28,47 (1913).confirmed that the peopleand
land of the New Mexico pueblos are subject to the guardianship of the United States: " p l y
a uniform course of action beginning as early as the 1854 and continued up to the present
time, the legislative and executive branches of the government have regarded and treated
t h e Pueblos of New Mexico as dependent communities entitled to its aid and

-

.

.

.

. protection

. . . ."

Accordingly, the federal government in general, and the Interior Department in
particular, unquestionably owe a fiduciary duty to the Pueblo Indians and their lands.

a

v. united State, 249 F.2d 189, 197 (10th Cir. 1957). Gert. denied, 355 U.S. 940

(1958). Again, the government effectively concedes this point; it does not even attempt to
contest the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the Interior Department and
Sandia.
Nor does the government dispute the nature or scope of that fiduciary relationship
As the Pueblo discussed in its opening motion, the courts have repeatedly held that, "When

'

"No purchase, grant, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thmto, from
any Indian nation .or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the
same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution."

the Federal ~overnmentundertakes an 'obligation of trust' toward an Indian tribe or group,

. . . the obligation is 'one of the hinhest res~onsibilitvand trust,' not that of 'a mere
contracting party' . . . ." Joint Tribal Council of the Passamoauoddv Tribe v. Morton, 388

F. Supp. 649, 662 (D.

Me.),

aff'd, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir.

1975) (emphasis added). &

Coast Indian Community v. United States, 550 F.2d 639, 652 (Ct. C1. 1977) ("The
United States, when acting as trustee for the property of its Indian wards, is held to the

..

most exactino fiduciarv standards") (emphasis added).

,'

The consequences of that fiduciary relationship for this case are clear: Where the
Pueblo presents a reasonable claim to disputed land, the Secretary of the Interior must
resolve the issue in favor of his Indian wards. See licarilla A~acheTribe v. S u ~ r o nEneru

a,
782 F.2d 855 (10th Cir.) (en band (adopting as the majority opinion the opinion of
Judge Seymour reported at 728 F.2d 1555 (10th Cir. 1984)), modified on other zrounds,
793 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 970 (1986).
In Jicarilla A~acheTribe,for example, the issue was the Interior Secretary's
.-

.

.

. accounting based on an interpretation of regulations dealing with royalties from oil and gas

resources owned by the Jicarilla Apache. The tribe had filed suit claiming that the
Secretary had breached his fiduciary duty by failing to interpret the royalty terms in the
manner that worked to the tribe's best interests. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit focused on
whether the interpretation of the royalty terms proposed by the tribe was "reasonable":
" m h e true issue in this case is not whether the Secretary's earlier
application of the royalty terms was reasonable; rather. it is whether the
atemative intmretation requiring dual accounting js also reasonable and
better Dromotes the Tribe's interest. If so, dual accounting should have
been required from the beginning." 728 F.2d at 1567 (emphasis added)
The court of appeals explained that the Interior Department's fiduciary
responsibilities to its Indian wards &the Department to adopt any "reasonable"
interpretation that most favored a tribe:

"When the Secretary is acting in his fiduciary role . . . and is faced with a
decision for which there is more than one 'reasonable choice' as that term
is used in administrative law, he must choose the alternative that is in the
best interests of the Indian tribe." I_d. (emphasis added).
Because the construction that most favored the Jicarilla Apache was reasonable, the court of
appeals ruled that the Secretary had breached his fiduciary obligations by failing to adopt
that construction: "Given two reasonable interprelations, Interior's trust responsibilities
require it to apply whichever accounting method . . . yields the Tribe the greatest
"1
-,

royalties."

Id. at 1569.4

The breach of the government's fiduciary duty in this case is even more egregious
'

than the one in Jicarilla A ~ a c h Tribe.
e
Here, the party adverse to the claims of the Pueblo
is not a private party, but rather the novernment itself. As the Pueblo argued in its opening
motion for summary judgment, and as this Court recognized in its decision denying the
government's prior motion to dismiss, "the fiduciary duty is most compelling where.

..

the adverse party to the claims of a tribe is the government itself." Dec. 10. 1996 b i n i o n
at 24.
.

.

Indeed, the courts have repeatedly held that, in such cases, the government must
subordinate its own interests to those of its Indian wards. For example, in Navaio Tribe of

Indians v.

United States, 364 F.2d 320, 322-34 (Ct. CI. 1966), thecourt found that the

government had violated its fiduciary duty when it allowed a private party to transfer a
lease interest in certain Indian lands to the government to enable the government to drill for

m,

Similarly, in Pvramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v.
354 F. Supp. 252,256
@.D.C. 1972), this Court (Gesell, J.) held that the government had failed to fulfill its
"most exacting fiduciary standard" when it made a "judgment call' in a land dispute against
the interests of an Indian tribe. The court emphasized that, in resolving Indian land claims,
all government officials must "liberally" construe relevant legal documents "to the benefit
of the Indians." Id.

.

'

tielium rather than ailowing the tribe to renegotiate for a higher rent. The court ruled that
"[slince the Department of Interior had an obligation to safeguard the
property of the Navajos when they were dealing with third parties, it is
clear that an even ereater dutv existed when the De~artmentitself enter4
into transactions with Indians. . . . Because of this &d because of the
Government's special duty toward the Indians, the various dealings must
be carefully scrutinized." a. at 322-23 (emphasis added).
Applying those "fiduciary standards," the court in Navaio Tribe held that, although the

..

action of the government may have been in the "national interest" because the assignment of

,'

the lease allowed the govemment to secure essential wartime helium, the government's
failure to advise the tribe of the additional value of the lease was "not consistent with the
government's duty to the Navajos."-u. at 323-24.
Once again, the eovernment has not even attempted to contest the Pueblo's
contentions or anv of the cases the Pueblo cited on this ~oint.' The government thus
concedes that it owes the "highest responsibility and trust" to the Pueblo, and that it is a
clear breach of that trust for the government to benefit itself by refusing to grant a

-

.

-.

.

.

reasonable claim presented by its ward. Accordingly, the Pueblo must prevail on summary

judgment if it presented the Interior Department with a "reasonable" tlaim to the land. As
shown in our opening motion and as summarized below, the undisputed facts make clear
that the Pueblo's claim in this case was far stronger than just "reasonable".

B.

The Undisputed 'Facts Demonstrate that the Pueblo
Presented the Government with a Meritorious Claim

The government barely contests the Pueblo's claim that its eastern boundary should
extend to the "main ridge" of Sandia Peak. And the government certainly fails to

'

The cases the government cites on pages 7-8 and 16 of its memorandum for the general
proposition of administrative discretion are inapposite given the special fiduciary
klationship between the govemment and Indiail-tribesfnot one of them involv& review of
a government decision with res~ectto an Indian claim.

establish that that claim was not at least "reasonable". The relevant facts underlying the
Pueblo's claim are thus virtually undisputed-and require only brief review:
In 1748, the King of Spain formally established the Pueblo. A royal grant document
was prepared that set the eastern boundary of the Pueblo's land as: "y por el oriente la

, the east the main ridge called Sandia."
Sierra Madre que llaman de Sandia," i . ~ ."on
,

~errerfromrhe Secrerary of rhe Inferior CommunicafingSupplemental Reponsfrom [he
Surveyor General of New Merico in Regard ro Cerrain Land Cfaimr in rhar Territory

(0~807).

When New Mexico was incorporated as a territory of the United States in 1848
following the Mexican-American

w&,the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo ratified all such

grants that had been made by the Spanish sovereigns. Pursuant to that treaty, on
December 22, 1858, Congress confirmed the Pueblo's 1748 grant and commissioned a
survey to record its boundaries. Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Facts No. 4. In
confirming the Spanish royal grant, Congress considered the same grant language as stated

. in the official translation by David Whiting (the "Whiting translation"). That translation,
quoted above, set the eastern boundary of the Pueblo's land as the "main ridge called
Sandia." Lerrer from rhc Secrerary of the Inferior Communicaring Supplemental Repons
from the Surveyor General of New Merico in Regard ro Cenain Land Claims in rim!
Terrifory (001804).

Following Congress' directive, the Surveyor General of the Interior Department
instructed his staff to reconcile a survey with the documentary evidence of the grant
boundaries. John Garretson, the original surveyor, received those instructions, directing
that the boundaries were to confirm the "original grant files" and incorporate all natural
Unless otherwise indicated, the Bates numbers refer to the documents submitted by the
government as the "administrative record" in the case.

markers. Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Facts No. 7. Those instructions, however,
were not followed by Reuben Clements -- a replacement for Garretson who eventually
surveyed the boundaries of the Pueblo in November 1859. Despite the fact that the Whiting
translation, which had been incorporated by the 1858 congressional confirmation, set the
eastern boundary of the grant as the "main ridoe called Sandia," Clements surveyed the
,
3

'.

eastern boundary as the foothill^ of the mountain. Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Facts
NO. 9. 7
The oovernment does not dis~utethat the Whitino translation set the eastern
hgundarv of the orant as the "main ridoe" of the Sandia mountains. Nor does the
government dis~utethat Clement~instead surveved the eastern boundarv as the foothills.
Rather, the government seeks to avoid the mandate of the Whiting translation -- the
translation used by Congress -- by contending, some 140 years later, that that translation is
erroneous. Specifically, the government contends that Whiting erred in translating "Sierra
Madre" as "main ridge" rather than merely the "mountain range." The government then

.-

. .

.

.argues that if "Sierra Madre" had been translated as "mountain range," it would somehow
I

As the Pueblo noted in its opening motion, at least one other court has questioned Mr. .
Clements' competence and overturned another erroneous survey he conducted affecting two
other New Mexico pueblos. Pueblo of Santa Ana v. &, 844 F.2d 708, 712 (10th Cir.
1988).
Contrary to the government's view, the Pueblo does not contend that Pueblo of Santa Ana,
establishes conclus~velythat Clemcnts was always "incompetent." But, as this Court has
recognized (Dec. 10. 1996 O~inionat 4, n. 1). the decision in Santa Ana makes clear that
Clemenu made mistakes in the same geographic area. Specifically, in Santa Ana the court
found that Clemmts had "strayed off course" and that his field notes "inconsistently located
the southeast comer" of the grant -- an "inconsistency [that] calls into question the validity
of the survey." 844 F.2d at 712. The court then characterized Clements' survey as
"inept." Id.
Indeed, anyone familiar with Sandia Peak - which rises from an elevation of about 7000
feet above sea level at the foothills meandered by Clements to the main ridge some 10,700
feet above sea level -- can perhaps understand why Clements (worldng with a mule and
surveying chains over a few days in November 1859) chose the far easier (but clearly improper) way out.

be clear that the Spanish land grant implicitly intended to convey only a "formal pueblo" --

a "custom" sometimes followed of granting -one league in each direction from the pueblo
plaza. This halfhearted attempt to challenge the merits of the Pueblo's claim fails for a
number of reasons.

m,the government is simply wrong in contending that the Whiting translation is
.

erronwus. Indeed, in a similar case involving the Elena Gallegos grant, which is
immediately south of Sandia, the Court of Private Land Claims led that by establishing

.7
8.

the boundary with even the more general language, "on the east the Sandia Mountains," the
grant could only be interpreted as extending to the

of the Sandia Mountains. Final

Decree in Donanciano Gurule v. United States of America, Case No. 51, Court of Private
Land Claims, November 1893 (0004 17-00011 9 ) . ~

m,and more importantly, even if the phrase "sierra madre" were open to more
than one interpretation, Whiting's translation is controlling in this case. Whiting was acting
in his official capacity as the govemment translator for the Surveyor General's Office when

-

-

.

.he translated the Sandia grant. W. Minge, The Pucblo of Sandia Gram Boundary

Issues

and Encroachmenn of Sandia Land Claim (Jan. 1983), at 33 (000001-000180). Robert
McClelland, then Secretary of the Interior, transmitted the Whiting translation to Congress

as the official translation for its use in confirming the grant. Letterfrom the Secrefary of
rhe Inferior Communicaring Supplemetun1 Repom from he Surveyor General of New
M&O

in Regard to Certain Lond Claims in ,hat Territory. WI79PI810). And Congms

then adopted the Whiting translation in confirming the grant. "An Act to Confirm the Land

Claims of Certain Pueblos and Towns in the Temtory of New Mexico" (Dec.

The government concedes that the proper translation of the grant language is a matter of
law, not fact. Gov't Mem, at 25, n.15.

1858)

The ~rarures'arLarge and Trearies of [he United Srares of America, (Boston:

Little, Brown & Company, 1859), XI, 374.
Thus, throughout the entire period in which Congress considered and confirmed the
Sandia grant, the federal government consistently treated the Whiting translation as the
correct articulation of the Pueblo's boundaries. The government thus cannot avoid its own
, official translation 140 years after the fact.

Third,the government's related reliance on the four square league "custom" ignores
the indisputable evidence presented by the Pueblo in its opening motion (Memorandum in

s u ~ ~ 0 1at- t20-22) that that "custom" was at best inconsistently followed and cannot
overcome the express words of the Whiting translation. &e k c . 10. 1996 O~inionat 7,
n.3. The government does not dispute, for example, that Spanish authorities granted
nearby Acoma Pueblo a total area of 95,791 acres -- more than five times the area of four
square leagues (which is about 18,000 acres) and nearly three times the corrected grant area
Sandia now seeks. Nor does the government dispute that Santo Domingo Pueblo was
. granted an

area of 74,741 acres -- more than four times the four square league "limit", and

more than twice the area Sandia will have after the correction. It is thus clear (and not
seriously disputed by the government) that the formal pueblo "custom" was hardly an
immutable rule that could ovemde the specific language of the 1748 Spanish grant later
endorsed by Congress. In any event, it is well-settled - and also not contested by the
government - that extrinsic evidence, such as evidence of "custom", can not be used to

place a construction on a deed that is inconsistent with its own terms. %, p.g., Duffield
v. Duffielcl, 127 N.E. 709, 710 (Ill. 1920). & ~ n e r a l l y26 C.J.S. && 5 92, at 850.

m,
it must again be noted that the Pueblo does not need to establish that the
grant language can Q&

be construed as setting the eastern boundary at the "main ridge' of

Sandia Peak in order to prevail in this action. Rather, as shown above and as never

-

disputed by the goveinment, given the federal government's fiduciary obligation to the New
Mexico pueblos, Sandia need only show that- it presented the Interior Department with a
reasonable claim to the disputed area. That much at least is established by the undisputed
fact that every Interior official who examined the issue up until Mr. Tarr's revised opinion
with the Pueblo's position:

-- In 1983, the Department's Office of Trust Responsibility issued a
memorandum endorsing the Pueblo's claim. Memorandum from rhe Direcror o f rhe

Officeo f Trlrsr Resootrsihiliries. BIA.

10

[he Slrocrinrendcnt. Solrrhern Pueblos

Acencv. BIA, (July 8, 1993) (000193-000197).

-- In

1986, after reviewing additional reports provided by the Pueblo, then

Assistant Secretary of the Interior Ross Swimmer endorsed the Pueblo's request for
a survey correction and sent it on to the Solicitor's Office for the necessary legal
work to correct the erroneous survey. Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Facu
No. 14.
.-

.

.

-- In April

1987. Timothy Vollman, then Associate Solicitor for Indian

Affairs, completed a fornial opinion concluding that the Pueblo had presented a
valid claim and that the erroneous survey should be corrected. Memorandwn from

Associale Soliciror. Indian Affairs to Anisranr Secrerarv. Indian Affairs (000757000769).

-- Even Mr. Tarr himself initially endorsed the Vollman opinion and sent it
on to the Agriculture Department with a notation that he was "inclined to adopt" it.

Lerrer from Solicitor Tarr ro Mr. Hick (April 8, 1987) (000771-000783).
The three opinions in favor of the Pueblo's claim by the most relevant Department
officials charged with Indian and claim issues stand unrcbutted. Not once during this
litigation has the government challenged any of those opinions as unreasonable in any way.

The government simply says that Mr. Tarr's later, contrary view was also a "reasonable
explanation." Gov't Mem. at 19. But that rather tepid assertion 1s insufficient given the
undisputed fiduciary law described above: Where the Secretary is confronted by the
Department staff with two "reasonable" conclusions, the Secretary has a fiduciary duty to
adopt the one favoring the government's Indian wards -- especially where, as here, the only
,

adverse party is the government itself.

&g

Jicarilla A~acheTribe, w,728 F.2d at

1567.

1

That well-settled fiduciary law does not, of course, mean that the Secretary must
always grant an Indian claim. There may be cases where a claim has so little merit that the
Department consistently rejects it. But where, as here, official after official who has
studied an Indian claim has found that the claim is valid

-- where even the Solicitor himself

indicated that he intended to adopt that view prior to political objections of another
f -- that more than "reasonable"
government agency'that wanted to retain the land for m

Indian claim can not be rejected. Clearly, the prior Interior opinions concluding that the

-

.

. Pueblo had a valid claim confirm the "reasonableness" of the Pueblo's position -- and that is
all that is necessary.
C.

The Government Does Not Dispute that Surveying
Measurements are Subordinate to Natuml Boundariq
Not only did the Pueblo dtablish in its opening papers that it had presented the

g o k r n e n t with a "reasonable" claim, it also established that the revised Tarr opinion
rejecting the Pueblo's position was incorrect as a matter of law. Memorandum in S

w

at 16-22. Again, the government has precious little to say in response.
The government does not even attempt to dispute the fact that the revised Tarr
opinion disregarded the well-established rule that Clements' meander lines are subordinate
to the call for the natural boundary of the "main ridge' of Sandia Peak. As the Pueblo.

discussed in detail itiits opening motion, where there is such a conflict in the description of
land boundaries, references to natural monuments control over references to mere surveying
distances. &,g.g., United States v. &,
Ana v.
-

260 U.S. 662, 664-67 (1923); pueblo of Santa

a,
844 F.2d 708, 712 (10th Cir. 1988); Metro~olitanWater Dis. of Southern

California v. United States, 628 F. Supp. 1018, 1025 (S.D. Cal. 1986); United State v.
McConnell, 612 F.2d 640, 643 (W.D. Va. 1985). This superiority of natural monuments
in determining boundaries requires that errors in meander lines be disregarded in favor of
the natural boundary.

B,
g.g.,

Red Hook Marina Corn. v. Antilles Yachtine Corn., 478

F.2d 1273, 1275 (3d Cir. 1973).
...

Nor does the government attempt to distinguish (or even mention) this Court's
decision in Pueblo of Taos v.

m,475 F. Supp. 359 @.D.C.

1979) (Gasch, J.)

-a

case on all fours with the instant facts, which confirms that the revised Tan opinion was
wrong. Like Sandia,.Taos had sought declaratory and injunctive relief acknowledging the
correct boundary between the Pueblo and adjacent land administered by the Forest Service.
.-

-- .

. In that case, an earlier court decree confirming the land grant had defined the eastern

boundary as "the current of [the] Rio Lucero to its source." However, an erroneous
government survey had failed to follow that natural boundary, thereby excluding about 300
acres. When the Forest Service, which held the neighboring tract, began encroaching on
the area in question, Taos requested that the Interior Department ascertain the precise
location of the eastern boundary. The Interior Department initially agreed with Taos that
the river itself was the proper boundary and ordered a corrected survey. The Secretary of
Agriculture, however, then asked the Attorney General to review the authority of Interior to
issue such an order. Reversing the Interior Department, the Attorney General concluded
that the land at issue properly belonged to the Forest Service. 475 F. Supp. at 363.

-

In rejecting the Attorney General's opinion, Judge Gasch correctly held that "[tlhe

- to meander the contours of a body of water
general rule is that where a surveyor intended
forming the boundary of a tract of land, the true boundq'is the body of water and not the
boundary lines." 475 F. Supp. at 366. Because the relevant documents specified that the
boundary was the Rio Lucero, that natural boundary prevailed over the surveyor's
,
.l

',

erroneous meander line, which had failed to follow the river all the way to its source.9
In short, Pueblo of Taoq makes clear that an erroneous govemment survey cannot
take precedence over a grant document that sets forth a natural boundary. By choosing not
to challenge Taos in its brief, the government effectively concedes that point as well.
Moreover, the govemment does not dispute that Mr. Tarr disregarded the wellestablished principle, also applied in

m,that the terms of a land grant 'should

be

liberally construed in favor of the Indian beneficiaries." 475 F. Supp. at 366. As the
Supreme Court has stated:
"The canon of construction applied over a century and a half by this Court
is that the wording of treaties and statutes ratifying agreements with the
Indians is not to be construed to their prejudice . . . . 'The
construction . . . instead of being resolved in favor of the United States, is
to be resolved in favor of a weak and defenseless people, who are wards
of the nation, and dependant wholly upon its protection and good faith.'"
Antoine v. Washineton, 420 U.S. 194, 199-200 (1975) (citations
omitted).
As Sandia discussed in its opening brief, this principle has been consistently applied
to construe any ambiguity in documents relating to Indian lands in favor of the Indian
claim. &,2.g.. Countv of Oneida. New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York
The same rule of precedence applies to lines that meander mountain ranges.
North Carolim v. Tennessee, 240 U.S. 652 (1916).

See,g g . ,

Indeed, when one considers that the rule adopting natural boundaries over mere surveying
measurements is founded on the common sense notion that the natural monuments are more
permanent and easier to recognize, the river bed in
(which was a mere stream near its
source) was not even as permanent as the ridge line of Sandia Peak which, of course, is
quite prominent and has never moved.

a,
470 U.S. 226; 247 (1985); Keweenaw Bav Indian Communitv v. State of Michioan,
784 F. Supp. 418, 424 (W.D. Mich. 1991).- Yet Mr. Tarr did just the opposite, contorting
himself to favor the government's own interests over the Pueblo's reasonable -- indeed,
valid -- claim.
In sum, the Pueblo presented the Interior Department with a reasonable claim to the

.
"i

.'

land in question -- so reasonable that every Interior official who considered the issue up
until December 1988 agreed with the Pueblo's position. In reversing those prior opinions,
Mr. Tarr disregarded a number of clear principles of law and breached the Department's
fiduciay responsibilities to the Pueblo. As shown below, none of the government's
.- -

arguments can refute these points.

II.

The Government Simply Repeats the
A ~ u m e n t sIt Lost on the Motion to Dismiss
The government attempts to avoid summary judgment by simply rarguing m a y of

the contentions it raised -- and lost -- on its prior motion to dismiss. There the Court
.correctly ruled that the Department's actions on the Sandia's claim are reviewable by this
Court -- under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 5 702, g
t m. (the "APA").

For the same reasons, the Court should reject the government's arguments once again, and
enter summary judgment in favor of the Pueblo.
A.

This Court Has' Already Ruled That the Secretary's
Refusal to Correct the Erroneous Survey is Reviewable

In denying the government's motion to dismiss, this Court ruled that the SecretKy
Hodel's refusal to order a corrected survey is a reviewable agency action: "This Court has
jurisdiction to &view the refusal of the Secretary of the Interior to correct an inaccurate
survey of public lands." Pec. 10. 1996 O~inionat 20. Disregarding that clear ruling, the
government once again argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review Semtary Hodel's

decision. The law has not changed in the nine months since the Coun ruled; and the
government's arguments must fail yet again.1.

This Court Has Jurisdiction to
Review the Secretarv's Decision

The government first contends that the Pueblo's claim is not cognizable under the
,
.l

APA because the statute granting Secretary Hodel the authority to correct the survey

provides no law for reviewing courts to apply. This argument is not new; it was

'.

specifically rejected by this Court in ruling on the motion to dismiss. Dec. 10. 1996
O~inionat 22. As the Court correctly held, "there are two grounds for reviewability of this
claim under the APA."

Id.

E k t , the refusal of Secretary Hodel to correct the erroneous survey is reviewable
given his fiduciary obligation to the Pueblo. The courts have properly insisted that the
Secretary's decisions with respect to the government's Indian wards must "not merely meet
the minimal requirements of administrative law, but must also pass scrutiny under more

.

.

. stringent standards demanded of a fiduciary." Jicarilla A~acheTribe, 728 F.2d at 1563.

See a h Chevenne-Anoaho Tribes of Okla, v. United Stat=, 966 F.2d 583, 590-91 (10th

Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1003 (1993).
Accordingly, the courts have consistmtly held the Secretary's usual d i d o n in
administrative matters is severely,limited in a case such as this by those heightened
fiduciary responsibilities.

. .
a,
s.g., r<ena~011and Gas. Inc, v. Deu't of kt-,

671 F.2d

383, 386 (10th Cir. 1982) (rejecting discretion argument because the Secretary's 'actions
nevertheless are limited by the fiduciary responsibilities vested in the United States as
trustee of Indian lands"); United States ex rel. Shako= Mdewakanton Sioux Cornmu&
v. Pan Am. Manaeemmt Co*, 616 F. Supp. 1200, 1208 @. Minn. 1985), &
dismiss@, 789 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1986) ("As a fiduciary, the Secretary is responsible for

acting in the best interest of the Indians and his actions mav therefore be reviewed")

-

(emphasis added).

Second, this Court has jurisdiction to review the Pueblo's alternative claim that the
Department's refusal,to correct the survey was influenced by improper political pressure.
Even those actions specifically committed to azency's discretion by statute are reviewable
on the ground the agency's decision in a particular case was occasioned by such

,

"impermissible influences." Hondros v. United States Civil Service, 720 F.2d 278, 293

-i

'.

(3d Cir. 1983).
In short, the govemment's contention that Secretary Hodel was entitled to breach his
-.

fiduciary duty to the Pueblo because of "administrative discretion" -- and that this Court can
do nothing about it -- is no more valid now than it was last December when it was squarely
(and quite correctly) rejected by this Court.
2.

-

.

-.

.

.

Secretary Hodel's Decision to Adopt the Tarr
Qoinion is a Final Aeencv Action Subiect to Review

The government next contends that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the

Pueblo's claim because Solicitor Leshy and Secretary Babbitt, as the successors to Solicitor
Tarr and Secretary Hodel, took no "final agency action." The govemment's argument
misses the point.
The Pueblo has not argued that the refusal of Solicitor Leshy and Secretary Babbitt
tokrrect the Pueblo's boundary (despite their promise. to withdraw the Tarr opinion)
constituted the administrative decision at issue in this case. To the contrary, as the

government itself concedes Gov't Mem, at 10, n . 7 , it was Secretary Hodel's decision to

adopt the Tarr opinion that was the "complete" and final administrativeaction Sandia
contests. The subsequent inaction of the Interior Department is relevant simply to show the
gmtinuin~breach of the Department's trust responsibilities to the Pueblo.

In any event,-SecretaryBabbitt's refusal to reverse the erroneous Tarr opinion is
also a final, reviewable administrabve action. An agency need not undertake an affirmative
act for there to be finality. Rather, the courts have held that finality is a pragmatic and
flexible concept, "focusing on whether judicial review at the time will disrupt the
t Health and
administrative process." Maryland D e ~ ' of
t Human Resources v. D e ~ ' of
Human Services, 763 F.2d 1441, 1459 @.C. Cir. 1985) (quoting

v. New Jersey, 461

U.S. 773, 779 (1983)). Where, as here, administrative inaction has precisely the same
adverse impact on the rights of a party as a denial of relief, that inaction is tantamount to a
final action and permits judicial review. Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 793 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
Here, Secretary Babbitt's refusal to correct the erroneous boundary continues to
deny the Pueblo its right to conduct its religious ceremonies on land it was gtanted by the
King of Spain and Congress -- and that refusal has the same legal consequences for the tribe
as any express denial of the Pueblo's claim. Judicial review at this point would not disrupt
.the administrative process because that process ended in December 1994, when Secretary

Babbitt refused to correct the survey. Thus, although the Pueblo's claim is based on
Secretary Hodel's adoption of the Tarr opinion, Secretary Babbitt's decision not to
withdraw that opinion constitutes final agency action as well.

-

B.

The Secretary's Fiduciary Obligations Subject His
Decision to a Heiehtened Standard of Review

In yet another refrain from the same song of "administrative discretion." the
govmment next contends that the Pueblo's claim fails because Secretary Hodel's decision
must be reviewed under an "arbitrary and capricious" standard. In so arguing, the
govmment once again tries to ignore the consequences of its fiduciary obligation to the
Pueblo.

In Jicarilla A~acheTribe, discussed above, the Tenth Circuit specifically reiected
just such an attempt to uphold a decision by -the Interior Secretary with respect to an Indian
tribe on the theory that the decision was not "arbitrary and capricious." The court in
Jicarilla A~acheTribe made clear that where, as here, the Secretary owes a fiduciary duty
to an Indian tribe, his decisions are not reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious
,

. '.

standard. To the contraiy, the Secretary's decisions "must & pass scrutiny under the
more stringent standards demanded of a fiduciary." 728 F.2d at 1563 (emphasis added).
See a l s ~
Cheyenne-Ara~haoTribes of Oklk,

u,
966 F.2d at 590-91.

As discussed above, this fiduciary duty requires the Secretary to adopt the position
most favorable to the interests of thd Pueblo, so long as that position is reasonable. Thus,
even if the Secretary's decision would ordinarily be reviewed under an arbitrary and
capricious standard, the fiduciary context of this case requires an additional, heightened
standard of review. . As the Court stated in Jicarilla

a ache Tribe, the Secretary "cannot

escape his role as trustee by donning the mantle of administrator . . . ." 728 F.2d at 1567.
,

-

.

.

.Significantly, the government does not even attempt to argue, nor cite a case to suggest,

that Secretary Hodel's decision passes muster under such heightened scrutiny.

C.

This Court Has Correctly Ruled That
the Ouiet Title Act Does Not A o d v

In what is nothing more, nor less, than a motion for reconsideration filed well after
the appropriate time, the government once again cites the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C.

8 2409a (1976) as a bar to this action. Again, the government's position has no more merit
now than it did nine months ago when it was squarely rejected by this Court Qkc. 10. 1996
-at

11) or, for that matter, in 1979 when the same theory was rejectd by Judge

475 F. Supp. at 365. As Judge Gasch held:
Gasch in Pueblo of T a u , =,

..

"This action . is not a Quiet Title Action; title to both parcels of land
involve rests with the United States, and has since the lands were acquired

from private parties several decades ago. This is an action seeking
review of administrative action, and therefore [the government's]
reliance on section 2409a is erroneous."
475 F. Supp. at 365.
As this Court recognized,
v.

is good law. As more recently held in Dunbar

w "any
,
challenge to a non-ownership interest in real property is not

precluded by the QTA." 905 F.2d, 754 759 (4th Cir. 1990).
In short, as this Court ruled last December, the Pueblo does not seek to transfer title
away from the United States. It seeks only to have that title administered by the Interior

.i

',

Department, in trust for the Pueblo and its people, rather than by the Agriculture
Department solely for the government's own interests. The govemment can no longer
10
ignore that distinction, the
case, or the decision of this Court in this very case.

D.

The Pueblo Has Stated a Valid Cause of Action
Based on I r n ~ r o w rPolitical Tnflr~ence

The government also disregards the Court's ruling last December in once again
arguing that the Pueblo has not stated a claim that the Interior Department's decision was
.-

.

,

.impermissible because it was the result of improper political pressure. In denying the
government's prior motion to dismiss, this Court ruled that the Pueblo has stated a valid
claim under the APA that "political pressure from two members of the legislative branch

lUThe govemment also implicitly raises the Quiet Title Act yet again in contending that
the Pueblo's claim is barred because it allegedlv
- .has other ootential remedies, i s . , the
government's refusal to correct the erroneous survey mighi be construed as a taking. The
government, however, made the identical argument in its motion to dismiss, and it was
necessarily rejected by this Court in concluding that the Pueblo has stated a cause of anion
under the APA.

As we have stated time and again, the Pueblo is not seeking -and the government most
certainly is not offering compensation for the erroneous survey. Instead, the Pueblo
simply asks for declaratory relief correcting the erroneous survey in light of the
government's breach of its fiduciary duty. As such, the Pueblo's claim - as this Court
ruled on the motion to dismiss - states a valid cause of action under the APA.

-

may have been the sole reason for the refusal of Hodel and Babbitt to order a corrected
survey." Dec. 10. 1996 Opinion at 22. The- courts have similarly led that administrative
decisions may be improper where they are the result of political pressure.
Federation of Civic Associations v.

&,

g.g.,

D L

m,459 F.2d 1231, 1245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1971)

("Even if the Secretary had taken every formal step required by every applicable stamtory

-.

,

provision, reversal would be required in my opinion, because extmneous pressure intruded
into the calculus of considerations on which the Secretary's decision was based") (majority

'.

opinion), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972): Texas Medical Assoc. v. Mathews, 408 F.
Supp. 303,306 (W.D. Tex. 1976) ("[Algency action is invalid if based, even in part, on
pressures emanating from Congressional sources"). 11
Contrary to the government's assertions, the Pueblo is not moving for summary
judgment on the political pressure theory. The Pueblo recognizes that whether the
Department's refusal to correct the erroneous survey was improper because it was
influenced outside the record by members of Congress is a factual question that is not-suited
...

.

.

.for resolution on summary judgment. For that reason. the Pueblo's instant motion is based
on its claim that the government's clear breach of its fiduciary duty to its Indian ward is
established by the undis~utedfacts that (1) the government has such a duty to the Pueblo to
make survey corrections that are reasonable, especially where the only adverse claimant is

The government's reliance in this regard on Sokaoeon C h i ~ w Community
a
v.

&&&,929 F. Supp. 1165 (W.D.Wis. 1996), rev'd on mons~derationin art, 961 F.
Supp. 1276 (W.D. Wis. 1997) is misplaced. That decision does not hold that it always
permissible for members of Congress to attempt to influence agency decisions. T o the
contrary, the court there noted that "[slome congressional or presidential staff pressure on
agency decisionmakers is plainly impermissible and can invalidate an agency's
administrative decision." 929 F. Supp, at 1174. The decision cited by the government
only held that the plaintiff had not made a sufficient showing of improper political pnssure
to entitle it to discovery outside the administrative record.
at 1178. (On
reconsideration, the court reversed even that limited ruling and concluded that the plaintiff
had made a sufficient threshold showing. 961 F. Supp. at 1280.)

u.

the govemment itself, and (2) in this case, the responsible Department officials have

-

previously held that the Pueblo's claim was,- at very least, reasonable -- indeed valid. 12
In any event, there is clear evidence that Secretary Babbitt and Hodel's decisions

were improperly influenced, and thus that theory must survive the government's crossfor summary judgment. For example, the government never disputes the account in

,

The Albuaueraue Tribune that Secretary Babbitt "was ready" to endorse a withdrawal notice
of the Tarr opinion that had been prepared by Solicitor Leshy but "backed off' after "New

"1

Mexico congressmen lobbied against it." Dec. 7, 1994 ed. at 1. That article specifically
referred to Senator Peter Domenici (R-N.M.) and Representative Steven Schiff (R-N.M.).
.

..

Such evidence is sufficient to raise a question of disputed fact which is fatal to the
government's cross-motion for summary judgment on the political pressure claim. 13

E.

This Court's Review is Not Limited to the
Administrative Record Provided Bv the Government

Finally, the govemment seeks to distract the Court by arguing that its review should
. ..

.

.

. be limited to the "administrative record," and that the affidavits filed by the Pueblo with its

I' Obviously, if the Court were to mle favorably on the Pueblo's fiduciary duty theory,
the alternative claim of improper political influence need not be pursued at all. The pomt,
which the government tries to obscure, is that the Interior Department may not kcat its
Indian wards as if they were just any other claimant who might be ignored in favor of
"political" considerations.

13- The government's contention that the Pueblo has failed to pursue discovery on the
disputed faaual issue of improper political influence is without merit. As the Court is well
aware, shortly after the complaint was filed in December 1994, the government moved to
dismiss and persuaded the Court to decide that motion prior to all othn matters. That roadblock by the government was not removed until December 1996. From that time until June
1997, the parties focused on finally obtaining an answer from the govemment (filed in
April 1997) and its response to the Pueblo's motion (June 1997).
If the Court were to deny Sandia's motion for summary judgment on its fiduaary
duty theory, that would be the time to permit plaintiff to take discovery on its alternative
theory that the Interior Department succumbed to the political pressure which has been
reported in the press and has never k n denied bv the eovemment.

motion are somehow'improper. That is a red herring. Even if this Court's review were
limited to the administrative record, it is clear
- from that very record that the Secretary
breached his fiduciary duty by failing to order a corrected survey. 14
In any event, it is well-settled that the Court has the discretion under the APA to
look at evidence outside the administrative record. In fact, the very case cited by the
government, ASARCQ v.

u,
616 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir 1980). confirms that discretion:

"The Supreme Court recognized in Overton Park . . . that even where the
agency has employed adequate fact-finding procedures, the courts may
find it necessarv to no outside the anencv record to evaluate aeencv action
pro~erly.. . . flit is both unrealistic and unwise to 'straiehtiacket' the
reviewine court with the administrative record." Id. at 1159-60
(emphases added).
Specifically, a reviewing court may consider materials outside the administrative
record where such evidence helps to explain or clarify the information that was before the
agency. &, g.g., Carlton v. &&&, 900 F. Supp. 526, 531 (D.D.C. 1995) (ruling that a
letter that explicated the agency's findings, and did not make new arguments, could be
considered by the court in evaluating the agency's decision). &g generally

v.

Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (summarizing a number of exceptions
permitting use of extra-record evidence).
Here the material facts concerning the merits of the Pueblo's underlying claim are
essentially undisputed. The affidavits submitted with the Pueblo's motion did not introduce
any new evidence or arguments that were not presented to Secretary Hodel and Solicitor

Tarr. Rather, as even the government concedes (Gov't Mem, at 24), those affidavits
merely summarized the materials that had been placed before the Department and put the
contrary decisions of the other Interior Department officials in favor of the Pueblo's claim

-

in context. As such, consideration of the affidavits and more importantly, the undisputed

..
l4 The administrative record here at very least consists of the materials submitted to the

Interior Department for its consideration of the Pueblo's claim.

materials they cite -:is entirely proper. But, again, the real point is that this case can be
decided in favor of the Pueblo's claim based- solely on the grant document, congressional
confirmation, and agency decisions which even the covernment concedes are properly part
of the undisputed record in this case.

M.. This Court Should Grant the Pueblo's
Reauest for Declaratorv Relief
At the end of the day, the Pueblo's motion for summary judgment stands
unrebutted. The government does not dispute that Clements disregarded the clear words of
, the Whiting translation which set the eastern boundary at the "main ridge called Sandia."

Nor does the government dispute that it owed a fiduciary duty to the Pueblo, and that it
would be a breach of that duty to fail to correct the erroneous survey.
Accordingly, the Pueblo respectfully requests that this Court grant its motion for
summary judgment Specifically, the Pueblo asks that this Court grant declaratory relief
that the eastern boundary of the Pueblo extends to "main ridge" of Sandia Peak,order the
Secretary of the Interior to issue a corrected survey reflecting that natural boundary, and
enjoin the Department of Agriculture from taking any action inconsistent with this Coun's
jud,oment.
Contrary to the government's assertions, the Court need not remand the matter to
the Secretary for reconsideration'in the event that the Court grants plaintiff's motion. The
court's powers under the APA are not so limited. Indeed, given that it was a breach of
fiduciary duty for the Secretary to refuse to a corrected survey, remanding here would be
fruitless. &, g.g.,

v. Wvman-Gordon C a , 394 U.S. 759, 766 n.6 (1969) ("It

would be meaningless to remand" where "[tlhexe is not the slightest uncertainty as to the

outcome of a[n] [agency] proceeding."); A.L. Pharma. Inc. v. -,
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (same). 15

62 F.3d 1484, 1489

-

In short, Sandia asks for the same typz of relief granted by the Court in Pueblo of

m. There Judge Gasch granted declaratory judgment that the eastern boundary was the
natural boundary specified in the grant document and enjoined the government from laking
,
'1
,'

action inconsistent with the judgment of the Court. 475 F. Supp. at 367-68. We
respectfully submit that this Court should do the same.

m,

Contrary to the government's assertions, Carno v.
41 1 U.S. 138 (1973) and
William v.
587 F.2d 1240 @.C. Cir. 1978) do not require that this Court remand
after a ruling that Secretary Hodel's decision was improper. Those cases merely hold that a
court should remand where the administrative record is not clear enough to permit judicial
review. 411 U.S. at 143; 587 F.2d at 1247. Here, by contrast, the administrative record is
clear that Secretary Hodel breached his fiduciary duty by refusing to order a corrected
survey.

u,

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Sandia's motion for summary judgment should be
granted and the government's cross-motion for summary judgment should be denied.
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